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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the problem of measuring end-to-end Incentive Compatibility
(IC) regret given black-box access to an auction mechanism. Our goal is to 1) compute an
estimate for IC regret in an auction, 2) provide a measure of certainty around the estimate of
IC regret, and 3) minimize the time it takes to arrive at an accurate estimate. We consider
two main problems, with different informational assumptions: In the advertiser problem the
goal is to measure IC regret for some known valuation v, while in the more general demand-
side platform (DSP) problem we wish to determine the worst-case IC regret over all possible
valuations. The problems are naturally phrased in an online learning model and we design
Regret-UCB algorithms for both problems. We give an online learning algorithm where for
the advertiser problem the error of determining IC shrinks as O
(
|B|
T
·
(
lnT
n
+
√
lnT
n
))
(where B
is the finite set of bids, T is the number of time steps, and n is number of auctions per time step),
and for the DSP problem it shrinks as O
(
|B|
T
·
(
|B| lnT
n
+
√
|B| lnT
n
))
. For the DSP problem, we
also consider stronger IC regret estimation and extend our Regret-UCB algorithm to achieve
better IC regret error. We validate the theoretical results using simulations with Generalized
Second Price (GSP) auctions, which are known to not be incentive compatible and thus have
strictly positive IC regret.
1 Introduction
Online advertising has grown into a massive industry, both in terms of ads volume as well as the
complexity of the ecosystem. Most inventory is sold through auctions, and demand-side platforms
(DSPs)—such as AppNexus, Quantcast, Google’s DoubleClick and Facebook’s Audience Network—
offer advertisers the opportunity buy inventory from many different publishers. In turn, publishers
themselves may run their own auctions to determine which ad to show and what price to charge,
resulting in a complicated sequence of auction systems. While auction theory has influenced the
design of online ad auctions, in practice not all auctions are incentive compatible. Practices such
as sequential auctions (where the winners of an auction on a DSP compete in further auctions on
the publisher website) and “dynamic reserve prices” (where publishers use a reserve price of e.g.
∗This work was done while the first author was an intern in Core Data Science, Facebook Research.
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50% of the highest bid in the auction) both violate incentive compatibility, even when individual
auctions are otherwise designed to be incentive compatible.
A lack of incentive compatibility in the ecosystem is problematic both for advertisers and DSPs.
Advertisers have to spend time and energy in figuring out the optimal bidding strategy for different
placements, a process which can be quite costly especially when incentives differ across different
publishers. For DSPs this is problematic because common budget management techniques, such as
multiplicative pacing, are only optimal when the individual auctions are incentive compatible [11].
Since (the lack of) incentive compatibility impacts bidding strategies for advertisers and the
quality of the product that a DSP offers, it’s important to understand the end-to-end incentive
compatibility of an ad system. But how should we think of quantifying incentive compatibility? IC
is a binary property: either a buyer maximizes their utility by bidding truthfully or she doesn’t.
However, this fails to capture that a first-price auction is “worse,” in some sense, than a second-
price auction with a dynamic reserve price of 50% of the highest bid. To capture these differences,
we focus on dynamically measuring IC regret :
IC regret(vi) = max
bi
Eb−i [ui(bi, b−i)− ui(vi, b−i)] , (1)
where vi is the true value of advertiser i, bi the bid of i, b−i the bids of other advertisers, and ui(·)
the (expected) utility of i. IC regret captures the difference in utility between bidding truthfully,
and the maximum utility achievable. By definition, incentive compatible mechanisms have IC regret
0, while higher IC regret indicates a stronger incentive to misreport.
In this paper we focus on measuring IC regret assuming only black-box access to the auction
mechanism. That is, for a given advertiser bid bi we observe whether this yielded an impression xi,
and what price pi was paid if any. While it seems restrictive to only focus on black box access, this
setting allows one to deal with the fact that auction logic is spread out over different participants in
the ecosystem (e.g. a DSP and publisher may each run an auction using proprietary code), and it
even allows an advertiser who has no access to any auction code to verify the end-to-end incentives
in the system.
Given black-box access to the auction mechanism, our goal is to 1) compute an estimate for IC
regret in an auction, 2) provide a measure of certainty around the estimate of IC regret, and 3)
minimize the time it takes to arrive at an accurate estimate.
We approach this problem using tools from the combinatorial (semi-)bandit literature: to mea-
sure the IC regret in an auction system, a bidder may enter different bids in different auctions1.
By judiciously choosing these bids, we give bounds on the difference between the measured IC
regret, and the true IC regret of the system as a function of the number of auctions the bidder
participated in. This provides a trade-off between the accuracy of the IC regret measurement, and
the the amount of time (and thus money) spend on obtaining the insight.
We consider the problem from two perspectives. The first, which we call the “Advertiser
Problem,” consists of determining the IC regret in the system for some known true value v. This is
the problem the advertiser faces when they are participating in an online ad auction. In Section 3
we give an algorithm to select bids that determine IC regret with an error that shrinks as O
(
|B|
T ·(
lnT
n +
√
lnT
n
))
, where B is the (finite) bid space, n is the number of auctions at each time step
and T is the total number of time steps. The second problem, which we call the “DSP Problem”
consists of determining IC regret for the worst-case valuation v, i.e. the value v that yields the
1In this paper, we consider the model that a bidder participates in many auctions and partitions them into several
blocks. For every auction in each block, the bidder enters a bid and only observes the allocation and payment of the
bid he enters from each block. For more formal definition, see Section 2.2.
2
highest IC regret. This is the problem that a DSP faces if they want to ensure that IC regret is low
for all advertisers that may use their services. In Section 4 we give an algorithm to select bids and
(hypothetical) values that determine worst-case IC regret over all possible values where the error
term shrinks as O
(
|B|
T ·
(
|B| lnT
n +
√
|B| lnT
n
))
as the number of time steps T grows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the main model and prelimi-
naries in this paper. Sections 3 and Section 4 discuss two main problems about measuring IC regret
in practice, the advertiser problem and the DSP problem. In Section 5, we consider the stronger IC
regret estimation for the DSP problem and extend our Regret-UCB algorithm to achieve better
IC regret error. Moreover, we discuss the continuous bids space setting. In Section 6, we run some
simulations with GSP auctions to validate our theoretical results. Finally, we conclude our paper.
1.1 Related Work
Structurally, designing incentive compatible (IC) mechanisms is well-understood: if the correspond-
ing optimization problem can be solved exactly then the VCG mechanism [22, 10, 14] is IC. In cases
where computing the optimal allocation is prohibitively expensive, and some approximation algo-
rithm is used, VCG is no longer incentive compatible [20]. At the same time, the structure of
IC mechanisms beyond optimal allocation is known, and tied to some monotonicity property of
the allocation function for single-parameter settings [19] and more generally [21]. A weakness in
these approaches is that determining if some given mechanism M is IC, one needs to know both
the allocation function and the pricing function. Without access to the code that computes the
allocation and pricing, the best an advertiser (or a DSP who depends on a third party auction
that’s run by a publisher) can hope to have access to is samples from the allocation and pricing
functions, not the functions themselves.
Lahaie et al. [18] are the first to study the problem of testing incentive compatibility assuming
only black box access. They design an A/B experiment to determine whether an auction is incentive
compatible in both single-shot and dynamic settings (the latter concerns cases where an advertiser’s
bid is used to set their reserve price in later auctions). The work of Lahaie et al. [18] provides a
valuable tool for validation of incentive compatibility, but leaves open the question of how to design
an experiment that minimizes the time required to get results with high confidence. The present
paper complements [18] by giving an algorithm to select alternative bids that minimize the error
in the estimate for IC regret.
Our work lies at the intersections of two areas, No regret learning in Game Theory and Mecha-
nism Design [7] and Contextual Bandits [6, 1]. On the one hand, in Game Theory and Mechanism
Design, most of the existing literature focuses on maximizing revenue for the auctioneer without
knowing a priori the valuations of the bidders [5, 3, 2], as well as optimizing the bidding strategy
from the bidder side [23, 4, 12]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper on testing
IC through online learning approach. On the other hand, our work is related to the literature
on Contextual Bandits. In the terminology of contextual bandits, the discrete bids in our work
correspond to arms, and the observed average allocation and payment of the selected bids at each
time correspond to different contexts.
1.2 Contributions
There are three main contributions of this paper.
1. We build an online learning model to measure IC regret with only black-box access to the
auction mechanism. We present algorithms that find IC regret with an error that shrinks as
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O
(
|B|
T ·
(
lnT
n +
√
lnT
n
))
for a known valuation v, and an error that shrinks as O
(
|B|
T ·
(
|B| lnT
n +√
|B| lnT
n
))
for all possible valuations v. In the above, B is the (finite) bid space, n is the
number of auctions at each time step and T is the total number of time steps. We also extend
our Regret-UCB algorithm to handle stronger IC regret estimation and shrink the error as
O
(
|B|2(lnT )2/3
n2/3T
)
.
2. We present a combinatorial semi-bandit algorithm for the setting where the ”observed reward”
is the max over several arms selected at each time while the benchmark is the standard optimal
arm with highest expected reward. To understand this mismatch between the benchmark and
observed reward, we analyze the Pseudo-Regret of the algorithm and uncover its trade-off with
the number of arms selected at each time. This analysis may be of independent interest to the
combinatorial (Semi-)Bandits literature.
3. Simulations suggest that, (1) there is a trade-off between Pseudo-Regret and the number of
blocks to partition auctions, i.e. we would like to choose number of blocks neither very small nor
very large, (2) the Pseudo-Regret (near linearly) decays when the number of auctions accessed
at each time grows, and (3) our designed algorithm performs better than naive Random-Bids
algorithm and ǫ-Greedy algorithm.
2 Model and Preliminaries
In this section, we formally define the model we considered in this paper and present some important
preliminaries. For simplifying description, we introduce ”test bidder” to model both the advertiser
and DSP.
2.1 Auctions for a Test Bidder
Consider a test bidder i who is eligible for n auctions every day. In each auction, they submit a
bid bi, the auction is run and the outcome is determined by the allocation rule gi : bi → [0, 1] and
the payment rule pi : b→ R≥0 (where gi and pi are conditioned on the competition in the auction).
We assume a single-parameter quasilinear utility model ui(vi, bi) = gi(bi) · vi − pi(bi) for some true
value vi ∈ R≥0. Let U be a bound on the utility of a buyer, i.e. the utility function is bounded by
[−U,U ].
Since there is a large number of auctions and other bidders in the ecosystem, we model the
randomness in the system using a stationarity assumption where the conditional allocation and
pricing functions are drawn from the same underlying distribution for each auction k:
Assumption 2.1 (Stochastic Assumption). For each auction k, the allocation rule gi and payment
rule pi of the test bidder i are drawn from an unknown distribution F , i.e. (gi, pi)k
i.i.d.
∼ F .
2.2 Online Learning Model
At every time step t, the test bidder participates n auctions and randomly partitions them into
m + 1 blocks of equal size.2 For j ∈ [m + 1], let Aj be the set of auctions in block j.
3 For every
auction in each block j, the test bidder submits a bid bjt ∈ B, where B is a finite set of bids.
4
2The number of blocks m is a variable that will be fixed later. The choice of which m to use will trade off the
number of different bids we get information on and the accuracy of the outputs for each bid. Throughout the paper,
we assume m < |B|.
3We let [n] = {1, 2, 3, ..., n} be the set of positive integers up to and including n.
4While in theory the bid space is continuous, in practice outcomes for different bids are relatively smooth, see e.g.
the plots in [18], so discretizing the bid space is a reasonable simplification. For more discussion, see Section 5.2.
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At the end of time t, in each block j ∈ [m], the test bidder observes the average allocation
probability g˜jt (b
j
t) and average payment p˜
j
t(b
j
t ) over all auctions in block j. Let
~bt = {b
1
t , b
2
t , · · · , b
m
t }
be the bids of the test bidder at time t. For block m + 1, the test bidder bids their true value v
and observes the average allocation g˜m+1t (v) and payment p˜
m+1
t (v). Without loss of generality, we
also assume v ∈ B. The average utility of the test bidder in each block j ∈ [m + 1] is u˜jt (v, b
j
t ) ≡
g˜jt (b
j
t ) · v − p˜
j
t (b
j
t ).
With the setting defined, we can instantiate an empirical version of the IC regret from Equa-
tion (1) for a given true value v and bid bjt :
Definition 2.2 (Empirical IC regret).
r˜gtt
(
v,~bt
)
= max
j∈[m]
{
u˜jt(v, b
j
t )− u˜
m+1
t (v, v)
}
. (2)
For notational simplicity, we denote g∗(·) , E
[
g˜jt (·)
]
and p∗(·) , E
[
p˜jt (·)
]
for each block j at
time t.5 Similarly, define u∗(v, b) , E
[
u˜jt (v, b)
]
≡ g∗(b) · v − p∗(b). Given these definitions, IC
regret for a particular true value v and bid b is:
Definition 2.3 (IC-regret). rgt(v, b) = u∗(v, b)− u∗(v, v).
Thus far, in Definitions 2.2 and 2.3 we’ve considered the regret that a buyer has for bidding their
true value v compared to a particular alternative bid b. The quantity that we’re really interested
in (cf. Equation (1)) is the worst-case IC regret with respect to different possible bids. For the
Advertiser Problem (which we treat in Section 3) this is with respect to some known true value v,
whereas for the DSP Problem (which we treat in Section 4) we consider the worst-case IC regret
over all possible true values v. To summarize, the learning task of the test bidder is to design an
efficient learning algorithm to generate vt and bt in order to minimize the following Pseudo-Regret,
the difference between cumulative empirical regret and benchmark.6
Definition 2.4 (Pseudo-Regret [6]).
E[R(T )] = max
v,b∈B
T∑
t=1
rgt(v, b) − E
[
T∑
t=1
r˜gtt(vt,
~bt)
]
(3)
Given the above Pseudo-Regret definition, we can define the error of determining IC regret,
which is to measure the distance between the optimal IC regret and the average empirical IC regret
over time.
Definition 2.5 (IC Regret Error). E(T ) = E[R(T )]T
2.3 More Related work
The online learning model in our work is also related to Combinatorial (Semi)-bandits literature
[13, 9, 17]. Chen et al. [9] first proposed the general framework and Combinatorial Multi-Armed
Bandit problem, and our model lies in this general framework (i.e. the bids are generated from a
super arm at each time step). However, in our model the test bidder can observe feedback from
multiple blocks at each time step, which is similar to the combinatorial semi-bandits feedback model.
5Throughout this paper, the expectation E is over all the randomness (e.g., randomization over payment and
allocation distribution and randomization over algorithm).
6Where in the case of the Advertiser Problem, we define Pseudo-Regret with respect to a given value v analogously.
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Gai et al. [13] analyze the combinatorial semi-bandits problem with linear rewards, and Kveton
et al. [17] provides the tight regret bound for the same setting. The Regret-UCB algorithm in
our paper is similar and inspired by the algorithm in [13, 17]. However, in our model, the reward
function is not linear and has a “max”, which needs more work to address it. Chen et al. [8] firstly
consider the general reward function in Combinatorial Bandits problem and can handle “max” in
reward function, however, there is a mismatch between the benchmark and observed reward in our
model (see more in ”Contributions”).
3 The Advertiser Problem
In this section, we focus on the special case of measuring the IC regret for a known true value
v. The learning problem in this setting is to select, for each timestep t, a bid profile ~bt of m bids
to be used in the m auction blocks at that time. The bids ~bt should be selected to minimize the
Pseudo-Regret defined in Equation 3.
We propose the Regret-UCB algorithm, given in Algorithm 2, which is inspired by the
CombUCB1 algorithm [13, 17]. Regret-UCB works as follows: at each timestep t, the algo-
rithm performs three operations. First, it computes the upper confidence bound (UCB) on the
expected utility of each bid b ∈ B given v,
UCBut (v, b) = ĝt−1(b) · v − p̂t−1(b) + 2U
√
2(m+ 1) ln t
nt−1(b) · n
, (4)
where ĝs(b) is the average allocation probability of bid b up to time s, ns(b) is the number of times
that bid b has been submitted in s steps and U is the bound of utility (i.e. utility is bounded by
[−U,U ]). Second, the algorithm chooses the m bids that correspond to the largest UCBut values;
call this bid vector ~bt. The algorithm uses the m bids ~bt in the first m blocks of auctions, and in
the final block of auctions, it uses the bidder’s true value v. Finally, for each of the blocks, the
algorithm observes the average allocation probability and payment, and it uses that to update the
estimates of allocation ĝ and payment p̂.
Algorithm 1 Init algorithm to get ĝ0 and p̂0.
Input: A finite set of bids B, parameter m and n
for b in B do
Randomly participate in nm+1 auctions and submit bid b for each auction.
Observe the average allocation g˜(b) and payment p˜(b).
ĝ0(b)← g˜(b), p̂0(b)← p˜(b).
Given a fixed valuation v, define b∗ to be the best-response bid:
b∗ , argmax
b∈B
rgt(v, b) = argmax
b∈B
u∗(v, b).
and denote ∆(b) , u∗(v, b∗)−u∗(v, b). The following theorem bounds the worst case Pseudo-Regret
of the Regret-UCB algorithm for known valuation v.
Theorem 3.1. Regret-UCB achieves pseudo-regret at most∑
b∈B:u∗(v,b)<u∗(v,b∗)
32(m+ 1)U2 lnT
n∆(b)
+
π2
3
·
∆(b)
m
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Algorithm 2 Regret-UCB Algorithm for a known valuation.
Input: A finite set of sbids B, parameter m,n. ∀b ∈ B,n0(b) = 1
Initialize: Run Init(B,m,n) algorithm to get ĝ0 and p̂0.
for t = 1, · · · , T do
Update UCB terms on the expected utility of each bid b
∀b ∈ B,UCBut (v, b)← ĝt−1(b) · v − p̂t−1(b) + 2U
√
2(m+1) ln t
nt−1(b)·n
Generate a sequence of different m bids ~bt ∈ B
m to maximize∑
b∈~bt
UCBut (v, b) (5)
for j = 1, · · · ,m do
Update nt(b
j
t )← nt−1(b
j
t ) + 1
Observe g˜jt (b
j
t ) and p˜
j
t (b
j
t)
ĝt(b
j
t )←
[
ĝt−1(b
j
t ) · nt−1(b
j
t ) + g˜
j
t (b
j
t)
] /
nt(b
j
t)
p̂t(b
j
t )←
[
p̂t−1(b
j
t ) · nt−1(b
j
t ) + p˜
j
t (b
j
t)
] /
nt(b
j
t)
for b /∈ ~bt do
nt(b)← nt−1(b), ĝt(b)← ĝt−1(b), p̂t(b)← p̂t−1(b)
To prove the theorem, we rely on the following lemma, which is widely used in stochastic bandit
literature. We refer the reader to check [6] for more material.
Lemma 3.2 ([6]). Fix a valuation v and an iteration t − 1 (where t ≥ 2). If a bid b 6= b∗ (i.e.
u∗(v, b) < u∗(v, b∗)) has been observed nt−1(b) ≥
8(m+1)(2U)2 ln t
n∆(b)2
times, then with probability of at
least 1− 2
t2
, UCBut (v, b) ≤ UCB
u
t (v, b
∗).
3.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
First we need some additional notations. Let ζt =
{
∀b ∈ ~bt, nt−1(b) ≥
8(m+1)(2U)2 ln t
n∆(b)2
}
be the
event that every bid in ~bt has previously been used at least
8(m+1)(2U)2 ln t
n∆(b)2
times at time t, ∆(~bt) ,
u∗(v, b∗) − max
b∈~bt
u∗(v, b)7 , and event ζt,b =
{
nt−1(b) ≥
8(m+1)(2U)2 ln t
n∆(b)2
}
. The proof consists of
7For notation simplicity, we still use ”∆” here to represent the minimum gap of the expected utility between the
bids in ~bt and the optimal bid b
∗
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three parts. First we upper bound the Pseudo-Regret in the following way,
E[R(T )] = max
b∈B
[
T∑
t=1
u∗(v, b) − u∗(v, v)
]
− E
[
T∑
t=1
r˜gtt(v,
~bt)
]
= max
b∈B
[
T∑
t=1
g∗(b) · v − p∗(b)−
(
g∗(v) · v − p∗(v)
)]
− E
[
T∑
t=1
max
j∈[m]
{
g˜jt (b
j
t ) · v − p˜
j
t(b
j
t )
}
−
(
g˜m+1t (v) · v − p˜
m+1
t (v)
)]
(a)
= max
b∈B
T∑
t=1
g∗(b) · v − p∗(b)− E
[
T∑
t=1
max
j∈[m]
{
g˜jt (b
j
t ) · v − p˜
j
t (b
j
t )
}]
(b)
=
T∑
t=1
g∗(b∗) · v − p∗(b∗)−
T∑
t=1
E
[
E
[
max
j∈[m]
g˜jt (b
j
t ) · v − p˜
j
t(b
j
t )
]∣∣∣~bt]
(c)
≤
T∑
t=1
g∗(b∗) · v − p∗(b∗)−
T∑
t=1
E
[
max
j∈[m]
E
[
g˜jt (b
j
t) · v − p˜
j
t(b
j
t )
∣∣∣~bt]]
=
T∑
t=1
u∗(b∗)− E
[
max
j∈[m]
u∗(bjt )
]
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
b∗ /∈ ~bt
}
·∆(~bt)
]
(6)
Equality (a) follows from the facts that E
[
g˜m+1t (v)
]
= g∗ and E
[
p˜m+1t (v)
]
= p∗. For equality
(b), the outer expectation is over the history of the test bidder up to iteration t−1, which determines
bt and the inner expectation is the expected maximum utility given bt (over the randomness of the
auctions themselves). Inequality (c) holds because E[max{X1, · · · ,Xn}] ≥ max{E[X1], · · · ,E[Xn]}.
Second, we decompose the upper bound of E[R(T )] in (6) into two terms. Then we have
E[R(T )] ≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
b∗ /∈ ~bt
}
·∆(~bt)
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
b∗ /∈ ~bt, ζt
}
·∆(~bt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 1
+E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
b∗ /∈ ~bt,¬ζt
}
·∆(~bt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 2
Then, we bound Term 1 and Term 2 respectively. First, we bound Term 1 in Equations (7).
The first inequality is based on the fact that for any random variables A1, ·, An and B,
1
{
∀i, Ai ≥ B
}
≤
n∑
i=1
1
{
Ai ≥ B
}
The second inequality is based on the exchange of two summands. The third inequality holds
because
E
[
1
{
UCBut (v, b) ≥ UCB
u
t (b
∗), ζt
}]
≤ P
(
UCBut (v, b) ≥ UCB
u
t (b
∗)
∣∣ζt),
8
and the forth inequality is based on Lemma 3.2.
E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
b∗ /∈ ~bt, ζt
}
·∆(~bt)
]
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
∀b ∈ ~bt,UCB
u
t (v, b) ≥ UCB
u
t (v, b
∗), ζt
}
·∆(~bt)
]
≤ E
 T∑
t=1
1
m
∑
b∈~bt
1
{
UCBut (v, b) ≥ UCB
u
t (v, b
∗), ζt
}
·∆(b)

≤
1
m
∑
b∈B,
u∗(v,b)<u∗(v,b∗)
∆(b) · E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
UCBut (v, b) ≥ UCB
u
t (v, b
∗), ζt,b
}]
≤
1
m
∑
b∈B,
u∗(v,b)<u∗(v,b∗)
∆(b) ·
T∑
t=1
P
(
UCBut (v, b) ≥ UCB
u
t (v, b
∗)
∣∣∣ζt,b)
≤
1
m
∑
b∈B,
u∗(v,b)<u∗(v,b∗)
∆(b) ·
(
1 +
T∑
t=2
2
t2
)
≤
1
m
∑
b∈B,
u∗(v,b)<u∗(v,b∗)
∆(b) ·
π2
3
(7)
What remains is to bound Term 2. In the following, let H = 8(m+1)(2U)
2 ln t
n∆(b)2
, and we bound Term
2 as follows,
E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
b∗ /∈ ~bt,¬ζt
}
·∆(~bt)
]
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
b∗ /∈ ~bt,∃b ∈ ~bt : nt−1(b) ≤ H
}
·∆(~bt)
]
≤ E
 T∑
t=1
∑
b∈~bt
1
{
b 6= b∗, nt−1(b) ≤ H
}
·∆(b)

≤
∑
b∈B,
u∗(v,b)<u∗(v,b∗)
∆(b) · E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
nt−1(b) ≤ H
}]
≤
∑
b∈B,
u∗(v,b)<u∗(v,b∗)
8(m+ 1)(2U)2 lnT
n∆(b)
(8)
Combining the inequalities (7) and (8), we complete the proof.
3.2 Discussion
The Regret-UCB algorithm can also be used to implement a low-regret bidding agent: Consider
an advertiser who knows the valuation v and wants to maximize the expected utility u∗(v, b) by
seeking for a best response bid b. Indeed, the advertiser can adopt the exact same algorithm –
Regret-UCB to maximize the utility. The analysis for regret bound in Section 3.1 also works
when we change the reward function from IC regret to utility.
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The term m appears in both terms in Theorem 3.1, hence we can pick it to minimize the
asymptotic Pseudo-Regret:
Corollary 3.1. Let ∆ , maxb∈B ∆(b) and ∆ , minb∈B ∆(b). Choosing m =
π
4U
√
n∆∆
6 lnT , the error
of determining IC regret achieved by Regret-UCB algorithm is upper bounded by
E(T ) ≤
|B|
T
·
8πU ·
√
∆ lnT
6n∆
+
32U2 lnT
n∆
 = O( |B|
T
·
(
lnT
n
+
√
lnT
n
))
4 The DSP Problem
In this section, we consider the problem of determining the worst-case IC regret over all possible
valuations v. Let v∗ and b∗ be the value and bid combination that yields the highest IC regret,8 i.e.
(v∗, b∗) = argmaxv,b∈B rgt(v, b), We modify our previous Regret-UCB algorithm in this setting
and show the pseudocode in Algorithm 3.
At each time t, the algorithm first computes the UCBs on the expected IC regret of each
valuation and bid pair (v, b).
UCBrgtt (v, b) = r̂gtt(v, b) + 4U
√
3(m+ 1) ln t
n ·
(
nt−1(v) ∧ nt−1(b)
) (9)
where r̂gtt(v, b) = ĝt(b) · v − p̂t(b) −
(
ĝt(v) · v − p̂t(v)
)
, ”∧” is the min function, and the other
notation ĝt, p̂t, nt−1(b), nt−1(v), and U are identical to Section 3. Then the algorithm selects
(vt, b
1
t ) to maximize the UCB
rgt
t term. Given the valuation vt, the algorithm chooses other m − 1
bids to achieve the (m − 1)−largest UCBut (vt, ·) terms defined in Equation 4. The rest of update
steps in the algorithm are exactly the same as in Algorithm 2.
We denote ∆(v, b) , rgt(v∗, b∗) − rgt(v, b) and start with the following lemma that gives the
concentration property of the UCBrgt terms.
Lemma 4.1. At iteration t− 1, (t ≥ 2), for a (value, bid) pair (v, b) 6= (v∗, b∗), where v and b are
both observed at least 48(m+1)(2U)
2 ln t
n∆(v,b)2
times, then with probability at least 1 − 4
t2
, UCBrgtt (v, b) ≤
UCBrgtt (v
∗, b∗).
Proof. First, we denote Ct(v, b) =
48(m+1)(2U)2 ln t
n∆(v,b)2 and observe r̂gtt(v, b) ∈ [−2U, 2U ], each auction
is i.i.d sampled from unknown distribution and each block contains nm+1 auctions. Based on union
bounds, i.e., inequality (u), and Hoeffding bounds, i.e., inequality (h), we have for any positive
integers s, ℓ ≥ Ct(v, b) =
48(m+1)(2U)2 ln t
n∆(v,b)2
,
P
(
r̂gtt(v, b) − rgt(v, b) ≥
∆(v, b)
2
∣∣∣nt−1(b) = s, nt−1(v) = ℓ)
(u)
≤ P
(
ût(v, b) − u
∗(v, b) ≥
∆(v, b)
4
∣∣∣nt−1(b) = s)+ P(ût(v, v) − u∗(v, v) ≥ ∆(v, b)
4
∣∣∣nt−1(v) = ℓ)
(h)
≤ exp
(
−2n · s ·∆(v, b)2
16(m + 1) · (2U)2
)
+ exp
(
−2n · ℓ ·∆(v, b)2
16(m + 1) · (2U)2
)
≤
2
t6
,
(10)
8We assume, without loss of generality, that this optimal combination is unique throughout the paper.
9We choose the remaining m− 1 bids be different with each other and b1t .
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Algorithm 3 Regret-UCB Algorithm for unknown valuation.
Input: A finite set of bids B, parameter m,n. ∀b ∈ B,n0(b) = 1
Initialize: Run Init(B,m,n) algorithm to get ĝ0 and p̂0.
for t = 1, · · · , T do
Update UCBrgt terms of every (v, b) pair
UCBrgtt (v, b) = r̂gtt(v, b) + 4U
√
3(m+ 1) ln t
n ·
(
nt−1(v) ∧ nt−1(b)
)
Choose (vt, b
1
t ) ∈ B ×B to maximize UCB
rgt
t (v, b)
if m ≥ 2 then
Choose remaining m− 1 bids {b2t , · · · , b
m
t }
9to maximize∑
b∈~bt\b1t
UCBrgt(vt, b)
Update nt(vt)← nt−1(vt) + 1
Observe g˜m+1t (vt) and update
ĝt(vt)←
[
ĝt−1(vt) · nt−1(vt) + g˜
m+1
t (vt)
] /
nt(vt)
p̂t(vt)←
[
p̂t−1(vt) · nt−1(vt) + p˜
m+1
t (vt)
] /
nt(vt)
for j = 1, · · · ,m do
Update nt(b
j
t )← nt−1(b
j
t ) + 1
Observe g˜jt (b
j
t ) and p˜
j
t (b
j
t), then update
ĝt(b
j
t )←
[
ĝt−1(b
j
t ) · nt−1(b
j
t ) + g˜
j
t (b
j
t)
] /
nt(b
j
t)
p̂t(b
j
t )←
[
p̂t−1(b
j
t ) · nt−1(b
j
t ) + p˜
j
t (b
j
t)
] /
nt(b
j
t)
for b /∈ ~bt do
nt(b)← nt−1(b)
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Moreover, for any s∗, ℓ∗ ∈ N+, we have
P
(
rgt(v∗, b∗)− r̂gtt(v
∗, b∗) ≥ 4U
√
3(m+ 1) ln t
n ·
(
nt−1(v∗) ∧ nt−1(b∗)
)∣∣∣nt−1(b∗) = s∗, nt−1(v∗) = ℓ∗
)
(u)
≤ P
(
u∗(v∗, b∗)− ût(v
∗, b∗) ≥ 2U
√
3(m+ 1) ln t
n ·
(
nt−1(v∗) ∧ nt−1(b∗)
)∣∣∣nt−1(b∗) = s∗
)
+ P
(
u(v∗, v∗)− ût(v
∗, v∗) ≥ 2U
√
3(m+ 1) ln t
n ·
(
nt−1(v∗) ∧ nt−1(b∗)
)∣∣∣nt−1(v∗) = ℓ∗)
(h)
≤ exp(−6 ln t) + exp(−6 ln t) =
2
t6
(11)
If the inequalities (10) and (11) are both violated, then it is trivial to show, given nt−1(b) =
s, nt−1(v) = ℓ, nt−1(b
∗) = s∗ and nt−1(v
∗) = ℓ∗, where s, ℓ ≥ Ct(v, b), UCB
rgt
t (v, b) ≤ UCB
rgt
t (v
∗, b∗),
since
UCBrgtt (v, b) ≤ r̂gtt(v, b) +
∆(v, b)
2
≤ rgt(v, b) + ∆(b) = rgt(v∗, b∗) ≤ UCBrgtt (v
∗, b∗)
where the first inequality holds because
nt−1(v) ∧ nt−1(b) ≥
48(m+ 1)(2U)2 ln t
n∆(v, b)2
,
the second inequality holds if inequality (10) is violated and the final inequality is based on the
violation of inequality (11). Let event ζt(s, ℓ, s
∗, ℓ∗) be
{
nt−1(b) = s, nt−1(v) = ℓ, nt−1(b
∗) =
s∗, nt−1(v
∗) = ℓ∗
}
and by union bound, we have
P
(
UCBrgtt (v, b) ≥ UCB
rgt
t (v
∗, b∗)
)
≤
t−1∑
s=Ct(v,b)
t−1∑
ℓ=Ct(v,b)
t−1∑
s∗=1
t−1∑
ℓ∗=1
P
(
UCBrgtt (v, b) ≥ UCB
rgt
t (v
∗, b∗)
∣∣∣ζt(s, ℓ, s∗, ℓ∗))
≤
t−1∑
s=Ct(v,b)
t−1∑
ℓ=Ct(v,b)
t−1∑
s∗=1
t−1∑
ℓ∗=1
4
t6
≤
4
t2
Utilizing Lemma 4.1, we show the worst case Pseudo-Regret analysis for IC-testing with non-
fixed valuation setting in Theorem 4.2, where the full proof is shown in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 4.2. Regret-UCB algorithm for unknown valuation setting (DSP problem) achieves
pseudo-regret at most
∑
v,b∈B,
(v,b)6=(v∗ ,b∗)
384(m + 1)U2 lnT
n∆(v, b)
+
2π2∆(v, b)
3
·
(
1
{
v 6= v∗
}
+
1
{
v = v∗
}
m
)
Following the same argument in Section 3, if we choosem appropriately, we will get the following
asymptotic bound.
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Corollary 4.1. Let ∆ , maxv,b∈B ∆(v, b) and ∆ , minv,b∈B ∆(v, b). Choosing m =
π
24U
√
n∆∆
|B| lnT ,
the asymptotic error of determining IC regret achieved by Regret-UCB algorithm is upper bounded
by
E(T ) ≤ O
(
|B|
T
·
(√
|B| lnT
n
+
|B| lnT
n
))
Note in the DSP problem, since we consider determining the worst-case IC regret over all
possible valuations v, our asymptotic error bound quadratically grows as |B|, while for the advertiser
problem the error linearly grows as |B| since the benchmark we consider there is weaker than it in
the DSP problem.
5 Extensions and Discussions
5.1 Switching value and bid
In Section 4, we assume the test bidder (DSP) only chooses one valuation vt at every time step t
to empirically estimate IC regret. However, in practice, for each (value, bid) pair, the test bidder
can switch the roles of bid and value to better estimate the IC regret.
Since there is no conceptual difference between bid and value in this setting, at time step t,
the test bidder also submit a ”bid” bm+1t for every auction in block m + 1. We still denote the
bids submitted at time t be ~bt =
{
b1t , b
2
t , · · · , b
m+1
t
}
. The only difference between this case and our
standard model is from the definition of empirical IC regret, we define the modified empirical IC
regret in this setting as below,
Definition 5.1 (modified empirical IC regret).
r˜gtt(
~bt) = max
i,j∈[m+1],i 6=j
{
u˜jt(b
i
t, b
j
t )− u˜
i
t(b
i
t, b
i
t)
}
where we consider all possible (value, bid) pair from bt. The learning task in this setting is to
design an efficient algorithm to generate m+1 bids at every time step to minimize Pseudo-Regret,
E [R(T )] , max
v,b∈B
T∑
t=1
rgt(v, b)− E
[
T∑
t=1
r˜gtt(~bt)
]
We extend our Regret-UCB algorithm with fixed valuation (Algorithm 2) for this setting and
show the pseudo-code in Algorithm 4. Very similar to Algorithm 2, at each time step, we update
the UCBrgt terms defined in Equation 9 for every (b1, b2) bids pair. Given these UCB
rgt terms, we
run Generate-Bids algorithm proposed in Algorithm 5 to generate m + 1 bids, which aims to
select the (value, bid) pairs with the largest UCBrgt terms.
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Algorithm 4 Regret-UCB Algorithm for IC testing when allowing switching value and bid.
Input: A finite set of bids B, parameter m,n. ∀b ∈ B,n0(b) = 1
Initialize: Run Init(B,m,n) algorithm to get gˆ0 and pˆ0.
for t = 1, · · · , T do
Update UCB terms on the expected IC regret of every (b1, b2) bids pair
UCBrgtt (b1, b2) = r̂gtt(b1, b2) + 4U
√
3(m+1) ln t
n·
(
nt−1(b1)∧nt−1(b2)
)
Run Generate-Bids Algorithm on UCBrgtt terms to generate m + 1 bids, which forms
~bt =
{
b1t , · · · , b
m+1
t
}
, where Generate-Bids is defined in Algorithm 5.
for j = 1, · · · ,m+ 1 do
Update nt(b
j
t )← nt−1(b
j
t ) + 1
Observe g˜jt (b
j
t ) and p˜
j
t (b
j
t)
gˆt(b
j
t )←
[
gˆt−1(b
j
t ) · nt−1(b
j
t ) + g˜
j
t (b
j
t)
] /
nt(b
j
t)
pˆt(b
j
t )←
[
pˆt−1(b
j
t ) · nt−1(b
j
t ) + p˜
j
t (b
j
t)
] /
nt(b
j
t)
for b /∈ ~bt do
nt(b)← nt−1(b), gˆt(b)← gˆt−1(b), pˆt(b)← pˆt−1(b)
Algorithm 5 Generate-Bids Algorithm for generating bids given UCBrgt terms.
Input: A finite set of bids B, UCBrgt terms for every (b1, b2) bids pair, where b1, b2 ∈ B.
Initialize a set B0 = {}.
while |B0| < m+ 1 do
Choose the largest UCBrgt(b1, b2) such that b1 /∈ B0 or b2 /∈ B0.
Update B0 ← B0 ∪ {b1, b2}.
10
We show the Pseudo-Regret guarantee for this setting in Theorem 5.2, the proof is in Ap-
pendix A.2.
Theorem 5.2. Regret-UCB algorithm for DSP problem when allowing switching value and bid
achieves pseudo-regret at most∑
b1,b2∈B,
(b1,b2)6=(v∗ ,b∗)
192(m + 1)U2 lnT
n∆(b1, b2)
+
2π2∆(b1, b2)
3(m+ 1)2
where ∆(b1, b2) = rgt(v
∗, b∗)− rgt(b1, b2).
Note the Pseudo-Regret bound achieved by Algorithm 4 is always better than it achieved by
Algorithm 3 for any m. Then we can always get a better asymptotic error bound by Algorithm 4
for the DSP problem.
Corollary 5.1. Let ∆ , maxv,b∈B ∆(v, b) and ∆ , minv,b∈B ∆(v, b). Choosing m+1 = O
(
n
lnT
)1/3
the asymptotic error of determining IC regret achieved by Regret-UCB algorithm is upper bounded
10If the two bids chosen in the last round are both not in B0, we randomly choose one to add it in B0.
14
by11
E(T ) ≤ O
(
|B|2(ln T )2/3
n2/3T
)
5.2 Continuous bids space
Thus far, we have considered a discrete bid space. We now extend our framework to allow
the advertiser to bid in a continuous bid space B (e.g. a uniform interval [0, 1]). Utilizing
the discretization result in [16, 15, 12], let B be the discretization of continuous bid space B
and DE(B,B) to represent the discretization error of bid space B and B such that DE(B,B) =
supv,b∈B
∑T
t=1 rgt(v, b) − supv′,b′∈B
∑T
t=1 rgt(v
′, b′). To avoid the conflict, we denote the Pseudo-
Regret in B be E [R(T,B)] and the Pseudo-Regret in B be E [R(T,B)]. The following lemma uncovers
the relationship of E [R(T,B)] and E [R(T,B)]
Lemma 5.3 ([16, 15]). Let B be a discretization of a continuous bid space B, then
E[R(T,B)] ≤ E[R(T,B)] +DE(B,B)
In practice, the expected allocation function g∗ and payment function p∗ are both relatively
smooth (see e.g.. the plots in [18]). Assume the Lipschitzness of expected allocation function and
payment function, the discretization error DE(B,B) can be easily bounded, then our Pseudo-Regret
analysis can be directly applied in this continuous bid space.
6 Simulations
In this section, we run some simulations with Generalized Second Price (GSP) auctions to vali-
date the theoretical results mentioned in previous sections. To visualize the performance of the
algorithms, we plot the Pseudo-Regret versus the number of time steps12 . Every experiment is
repeated for 10 times and the dash area represents the 95% confidence intervals of Pseudo-Regret
at each time step.
6.1 Settings
At each time t, the test bidder randomly participates n GSP auctions. Each auction has 5 slots and
20 bidders without counting the test bidder, each bidder’s bid is generated from uniform distribution
on [0, 10]. The click-through-rate sequence of each auction is generated from descending ordered
Beta(2, 5) distribution (i.e. click-through-rate of each slot is first i.i.d generated from Beta(2, 5)
and then arranged by descending order). We consider a finite bids space B , {0.01, 0.02, · · · , 10}.
6.2 The advertiser problem
We test the performance ofRegret-UCB algorithm with known valuation v = 9.5. First, we fix the
number of blocks be 16 (i.e. m = 15) and plot the Pseudo-Regret achieved by Regret-UCB with
different number of auctions the test bidder participates at each time step, i.e. n = 16, 64, 256, 1024
11This asymptotic error bound can be achieved if the optimal m can be chosen to satisfy the constraint that
m < |B|.
12In the experiments section, Pseudo-Regret refers to the upper bound of E[R(T )] derived by Equations (6), (12)
and (15) respectively.
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Figure 1: A semi-logarithmic plot of Pseudo-Regret ofRegret-UCB algorithm for known valuation v = 9.5
(Algorithm 2).
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Figure 2: Pseudo-Regret plot of Regret-UCB algorithm for unknown valuation. (a): Algorithm 3 for dif-
ferent n, (b): Algorithm 3 for different m and (c): a semi-logarithmic Pseudo-Regret to compare Algorithm 3
and Algorithm 4.
(Figure 1(a)). We observe that the Pseudo-Regret decays linearly with n which is consistent with
our analysis.
Second, we fix n = 1024 and test the performance of the algorithm with different number of
blocks, such as m = 1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 63 (Figure 1(a)). We find m = 7 (8 blocks) achieves the lowest
Pseudo-Regret. When m is too large, the Pseudo-Regret curve incurs some shocks and suffers high
variance because of the noisy observed information at each time.
6.3 The DSP problem
In this simulation, we test the performance of Regret-UCB for unknown valuation case (i.e.,
the DSP problem). Similarly, we show the Pseudo-Regret curve for different n given m = 15 and
different m given n = 1024 in Figure 2. Figure 2(a) validates that Pseudo-Regret decays when
n grows and we observe m = 3 (4 blocks) gives the best Pseudo-Regret. This corresponds to
our theory that the optimal m in the DSP problem should be smaller than the optimal m in the
advertiser problem for the same auction setting when |B| is large (see Corollary (3.1) and (4.1)).
6.4 Efficiency of Regret-UCB algorithm
We first introduce two standard baselines used in this section, Random-Bids algorithm and
ǫ-Greedy algorithm.
Random-Bids. At each time step t, the advertiser uniformly randomly choose m bids bt,
while the DSP uniformly randomly choose m bids bt and a valuation vt from B.
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Figure 3: A semi-logarithmic plot of Pseudo-Regret with Random-Bids, ǫ-Greedy and Regret-UCB
(Algorithm 3) for the advertiser problem (a) and DSP problem (b).
ǫ-Greedy. For the advertiser problem with known valuation v, at each time step, the advertiser
uniformly randomly chooses m bids from B with probability ǫ, otherwise, chooses the m bids that
correspond to the largest average utility uˆ(v, ·) terms.13 For the DSP problem, at each time step
t, the DSP uniformly randomly choose m bids bt and a valuation vt with probability ǫ. Otherwise,
the DSP chooses the (vt, b
1
t ) pair corresponds to the largest r̂gt terms and the rest m − 1 bids
associated with the largest uˆ(vt, ·) terms.
We compare the performance of our Regret-UCB algorithm with the above two baselines for
the advertiser problem and the DSP problem. For the both settings, Regret-UCB algorithm
performs better than two baselines for different number of blocks.
6.5 Regret-UCB when allowing switching value and bid
Moreover, we compare the performance of Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 for different m given
n = 1024 in Figure 2(c) to validate the theory that allowing switching value and bid leads to
lower Pseudo-Regret.14 In addition, we also observe the tradeoff between Pseudo-Regret and m of
Algorithm 4. Among m = 1, 15, 63, the optimal m is 15 (16 blocks) for Algorithm 4. If we choose
m too large, like m = 63, Pseudo-Regret is worse than m = 1 case and incurs high variance.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the problem of measuring end-to-end Incentive Compatibility regret only
given a black-box access to an auction mechanism. We consider two different main problems,
where in the advertiser problem the goal is to measure IC regret for some known valuation v and
in the more general demand-side platform (DSP) problem we want to determine the worst-case
IC regret over all possible valuations. For both problems, we propose online learning algorithms
to measure the IC regret given the feedback (allocation and payment) of the auction mechanism
when the test bidder participating auctions at each time. We theoretically bound the error of
determining IC regret for both problems and extend to more general settings. Finally, we run
simulations to validate our results. For next steps, it is worth exploring further avenues of relaxing
the informational assumptions (e.g. what if the distributions of allocation and payment of auctions
are non stationary) and testing our algorithms over real auctions data.
13In the experiments, we fix ǫ = 0.1
14Based on our observation in the experiments, sometimes switching value and bid may ”over-estimate” the IC
regret, i.e. the empirical estimation of IC regret is sometimes larger than worst case IC regret.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2
We first denote some necessary notations in this section. Let Ct(v, b) =
48(m+1)(2U)2 ln t
n·∆2(v,b)
. Let event
ζt be
ζt =
{
∀b ∈ ~bt, nt−1(vt) ∧ nt−1(b) ≥ Ct(vt, b)
}
Let (v,~bt) ≡
{
(v, b1t ), · · · , (v, b
m
t )
}
, and ∆(v,~bt) = minj∈[m]∆(v, b
j
t ) = rgt(v
∗, b∗)−maxj∈[m] rgt(v, b
j
t ).
Moreover, let event ζt,b be
{
nt−1(vt) ∧ nt−1(b) ≥ Ct(vt, b)
}
. Following the similar proof steps in
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Theorem 3.1, we first bound E[R(T )] as below,
E[R(T )]
= max
v,b∈B
[
T∑
t=1
rgt(v, b)
]
− E
[
T∑
t=1
r̂gtt(vt,
~bt)
]
(a)
=
T∑
t=1
rgt(v∗, b∗)−
T∑
t=1
E
[
E
[
max
j∈[m]
g˜jt (b
j
t ) · vt − p˜
j
t(b
j
t )
∣∣∣vt,~bt]]+ T∑
t=1
E
[
E
[
g˜m+1(vt) · vt − p˜
m+1
t (vt)
]∣∣∣vt]
(b)
≤
T∑
t=1
rgt(v∗, b∗)−
T∑
t=1
E
[
max
j∈[m]
E
[
g˜jt (b
j
t ) · vt − p˜
j
t (b
j
t )
∣∣∣vt,~bt]]+ T∑
t=1
E [u∗(vt, vt)]
=
T∑
t=1
rgt(v∗, b∗)− E
[
max
j∈[m]
rgt(vt, b
j
t )
]
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
(v∗, b∗) /∈ (vt,~bt)
}
·
(
rgt(v∗, b∗)− max
j∈[m]
rgt(vt, b
j
t )
)]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
(v∗, b∗) /∈ (vt,~bt)
}
·∆(vt,~bt)
]
(12)
where inequality (a) is based on the separation of expectation trick used in Equation 6(b) and
inequality (b) holds because E[max{X1, · · · ,Xn}] ≥ max{E[X1], · · · , E[Xn]}. Then we separate
the upper bound of E [R(T )] in Equations (12) into two terms,
E[R(T )] ≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
(v∗, b∗) /∈ (vt,~bt), ζt
}
·∆(vt,~bt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 1
+E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
(v∗, b∗) /∈ (vt,~bt),¬ζt
}
·∆(vt,~bt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 2
Finally we bound Term 1 and Term 2 respectively. For Term 1, we do the following decom-
position,
Term 1 ≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
(v∗, b∗) /∈ (vt,~bt), ζt
}
·∆(vt,~bt)
]
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
∆(vt,~bt) ·
(
1
{
vt = v
∗, b∗ /∈ ~bt, ζt
}
+ 1
{
vt 6= v
∗, ζt
})]
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
vt = v
∗, b∗ /∈ ~bt, ζt
}
·∆(vt,~bt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗)
+E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
vt 6= v
∗, ζt
}
·∆(vt,~bt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(#)
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For term (∗), we have
(∗) ≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
vt = v
∗,UCBrgtt (vt, b
j
t) ≥ UCB
rgt
t (v
∗, b∗),∀j ∈ [m], ζt
}
·∆(vt,~bt)
]
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
∆(vt,~bt)
m
·
m∑
j=1
1
{
UCBut (v
∗, bjt ) ≥ UCB
u
t (v
∗, b∗), ζt
}]
(c)
≤
∑
b6=b∗
∆(v∗, b)
m
·
(
1 +
T∑
t=1
4
t2
)
≤
∑
b6=b∗
2π2∆(v∗, b)
3m
where the last inequality above holds based on Lemma 4.1. Next we consider term (#),
(#) ≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
∆(vt,~bt) · 1
{
vt 6= v
∗,UCBrgtt (vt, b
1
t ) ≥ UCB
rgt
t (v
∗, b∗), ζt
}]
≤
∑
v,b∈B,v 6=v∗
∆(v, b) ·
T∑
t=1
P
(
UCBrgtt (vt, b) ≥ UCB
rgt
t (v
∗, b∗)
∣∣∣ζt,b)
Lemma 4.1
≤
∑
v,b∈B,v 6=v∗
∆(v, b) ·
(
1 +
T∑
t=2
4
t2
)
=
∑
v,b∈B,v 6=v∗
2π2∆(v, b)
3
Thus, Term 1 can be bounded by
Term 1 ≤
∑
v,b∈B,
(v,b)6=(v∗ ,b∗)
2π2∆(v, b)
3
·
(
1
{
v 6= v∗
}
+
1
{
v = v∗
}
m
)
(13)
What remains is to bound Term 2,
Term 2
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
∆(vt,~bt) ·
(
1
{
∃b ∈ ~bt, nt−1(vt) ≤ Ct(vt, b)
}
+ 1
{
∃b ∈ ~bt, nt−1(b) ≤ Ct(vt, b)
})]
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
∑
b∈bt
∆(vt, b) ·
(
1
{
nt−1(vt) ≤ Ct(vt, b)
}
+ 1
{
nt−1(b) ≤ Ct(vt, b)
})]
≤
∑
v,b∈B,
(v,b)6=(v∗ ,b∗)
∆(v, b) ·
( T∑
t=1
1
{
nt−1(v) ≤ Ct(v, b)
}
+ 1
{
nt−1(b) ≤ Ct(v, b)
}
≤
∑
v,b∈B,
(v,b)6=(v∗ ,b∗)
2∆(v, b)CT (v, b) =
96(m + 1)(2U)2 lnT
n∆(v, b)
(14)
Combining inequalities (13) and (14) we complete the proof.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2
This proof is a straightforward extension of the proof in Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.2. We only
show the significant difference of this proof. Let’s first denote some different notations used in this
section. Let event
ζt ,
{
∀i, j ∈ [m+ 1], nt−1
(
bit
)
∧ nt−1
(
bjt
)
≥
48(m+ 1)(2U)2 ln t
n∆2
(
bit, b
j
t
) }
and
ζt,b1,b2 ,
{
nt−1
(
b1
)
∧ nt−1
(
b2
)
≥
48(m+ 1)(2U)2 ln t
n∆2
(
b1, b2
) }
Denote ~bt⊗~bt ,
{(
bit, b
j
t
)}
i,j∈[m+1],i 6=j
and ∆(~bt) = rgt(v
∗, b∗)−maxi,j∈[m+1],i 6=j rgt
(
bit, b
j
t
)
. Follow
the same argument adopted in Section 3.1, we first decompose the Pseudo-Regret in the following
way,
E [R(T )] ≤
T∑
t=1
rgt(v∗, b∗)−
T∑
t=1
E
[
E
[
max
i,j∈[m+1],i 6=j
u˜jt
(
bit, b
j
t
)
− u˜it
(
bit, b
i
t
)∣∣∣~bt]]
≤
T∑
t=1
rgt(v∗, b∗)−
T∑
t=1
E
[
max
i,j∈[m+1],i 6=j
u∗
(
bit, b
j
t
)
− u∗
(
bit, b
i
t
)]
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
(v∗, b∗) /∈ ~bt ⊗~bt
}
·∆(~bt)
]
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
(v∗, b∗) /∈ ~bt ⊗~bt, ζt
}
·∆(~bt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗)
+E
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
(v∗, b∗) /∈ bt ⊗ bt,¬ζt
}
·∆(~bt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(#)
(15)
What remains is to bound term (∗) and term (#). To bound (∗), we use the exactly same
technique in Equations 7, the difference is that we need to consider UCBrgt terms and any bids
combination (b1, b2) in ~bt ⊗~bt,
(∗) ≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
1
m(m+ 1)
·
[ ∑
b1,b2∈~bt
b1 6=b2
∆(b1, b2) · 1
{
UCBrgtt (b1, b2) ≥ UCB
rgt
t (v
∗, b∗), ζt
}]]
≤
∑
b1,b2∈B
∆(b1, b2)
(m+ 1)2
·
T∑
t=1
P
(
UCBrgtt (b1, b2) ≥ UCB
rgt
t (v
∗, b∗)
∣∣∣ζt,b1,b2)
≤
∑
b1,b2∈B
∆(b1, b2)
(m+ 1)2
·
(
1 +
T∑
t=1
4
t2
)
≤
∑
b1,b2∈B
2π2∆(b1, b2)
3(m+ 1)2
(16)
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To bound (#), we utilize the same argument in Equations (14).
(#) ≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
∆(~bt) · 1
{
∃bit, b
j
t ∈ bt, nt−1(b
i
t) ≤
48(m+ 1)(2U)2 ln t
n ·∆2(bit, b
j
t )
}]
≤ E
 T∑
t=1
∑
b1,b2∈bt
∆(~bt) · 1
{
nt−1(b1) ≤
48(m+ 1)(2U)2 ln t
n ·∆2(b1, b2)
}
≤
∑
b1,b2∈B
∆(b1, b2)
T∑
t=1
1
{
nt−1(b1) ≤
48(m+ 1)(2U)2 ln t
n ·∆2(b1, b2)
}
≤
∑
b1,b2∈B
192(m + 1)U2 lnT
n ·∆(b1, b2)
(17)
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